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The Civil War of Waste'
Here's the rub: "'How can you properly manage wastes when
you have no control on the amount of wastes coming in[to the
state]?' "2 This question has plagued many state and local governments since the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Fort GratiotLandfill v. Michigan Department of Natural
Resources.- The Court in Fort Gratiot held that a Michigan statute 4 prohibiting private landfills from accepting waste originating
outside the county in which the landfill is located, violated the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.' The National Solid Waste Management Association calculates that approximately fifteen million tons of municipal solid waste ("MSW")
was transported interstate in 1989.8 That fifteen million tons represents about eight percent of the trash created by the entire
United States. 7 The chief importers of this trash were Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana and Virginia, with the principal exporters of
fifty-three percent of this out-of-state waste being New Jersey and
New York. 8 What actions does the Commerce Clause prohibit importing states to take? What actions does it allow? Should the federal government step in and regulate this area? What are the con1. Matt Yancy, States Reach Compromise On Bill to Stem Interstate Trash
Shipping, THE AssocIATED PRESS, July 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, Envtl Library
(quoting an unnamed United States Senator commenting on the battle between the states
who have tried to ban the import of municipal solid waste ("MSW") from other states).
2. Todd Sloane, Midwest States Battling Deluge of Eastern Trash, CRAINS CLEVELAND BUSINESS, Aug. 6, 1990 at 10 (quoting Mike Savage, a solid-waste official with the Ohio
Environmental Protection Agency).
3. 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992).
4. Solid Waste Management Act, MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 299.401-.437 (West
1984 and Supp. 1991).
5. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2028. The Michigan statute allowed each county's
Solid Waste Management Board to authorize the importation of MSW, but St. Clair
County's Board did not do so. Id. at 2022. The suit was brought by Fort Gratiot due to this
exclusion by St. Clair County. Id.
The Commerce Clause provides: "Congress shall have Power. .. [t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
6. Yancy, cited at note 1.
7. Id.
8. Id. New York and New Jersey also import some small amount of MSW, but this
statistic represents only the exported amount, not the net of exports over imports. Id.
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sequences of federal intervention and regulation? This comment
will answer these questions, and offer a solution to the dilemma
afflicting states: What are we going to do with our trash?
RESTRICTIONS ON BANS OF THE INTERSTATE DISPOSAL OF WASTE

The first eruption of the trash battle ensued in early 1973, when
New Jersey enacted its Waste Control Act ("New Jersey Act").'
The New Jersey Act barred the importation of "any solid or liquid
wastes which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State."1 0 Several private New Jersey landfill operators,
and neighboring states that had agreements with these operators,
challenged the new law in New Jersey state court on state and federal grounds.1 While the trial court found the New Jersey law unconstitutional because it discriminated against interstate commerce, the Supreme Court of New Jersey concluded that the law
advanced vital health and environmental objectives, with only incidental effect on interstate commerce, and reversed the decision.12
In its decision on the appeal to the United States Supreme Court,
the Court stated that the New Jersey Act, "block[ed] the importation of waste in an obvious effort to saddle those outside the State
with the entire burden of slowing the flow of refuse into New
Jersey's remaining landfill sites."'" It held that the New Jersey Act
was "clearly impermissible under the Commerce Clause of the

Constitution.

'14

The Court definitively stated in City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey that garbage was, indeed, an article of interstate commerce,
and could not be restricted by the states unless authorized by Congress, or unless dictated by genuine health and safety reasons."6 As
the Court could find no distinction between New Jersey's garbage
(which was allowed in New Jersey landfills) and other states' garbage (which was not), it declined to allow the state to discriminate
against the garbage of other states."
From the time of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
9. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:11-1 (West Supp. 1978).
10. N.J. STAT. ANN. §13:11-10 (West Supp. 1978).
11. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth.,
316 A.2d 711 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1974), rev'd, 348 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1975), rev'd sub
nom. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
12. Hackensack Meadowlands, 348 A.2d at 514.
13. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978).
14. City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 629.
15. Id. at 622.
16. Id. at 626-27.
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City of Philadelphia,until the present, states have continued to
search for creative ways to keep out-of-state trash from entering
their landfills.17 Due to the fungibility of non-hazardous waste (it
all has the same foul characteristics), in Fort Gratiot, Michigan attempted to distinguish its plan from New Jersey's, arguing that
unlike New Jersey's complete ban on MSW imports, the Michigan
plan did not discriminate against out-of-state MSW in favor of instate waste."8 Rather, each county could prohibit imports of MSW
from other counties within the state, as well as from outside the
state.1 9 In other words, it discriminated against waste coming from
other counties in the state, so that it was not singling out garbage
from other states. This distinction did not persuade the Court. It
had already addressed this argument in City of Philadelphia,noting, "[w]hat is crucial is the attempt by one State to isolate itself
from a problem common to many by erecting a barrier against the
movement of interstate trade. ' 20 The Michigan statute was clearly
an attempt to keep its landfills free of out-of-state waste, ensuring
that its citizens could continue to dispose of their waste in the future. During oral argument, Fort Gratiot's counsel, Harold Finn,
argued that with the amount of garbage that it wanted to import,
Fort Gratiot would still have twenty years of landfill capacity
left." Michigan disputed that figure, arguing that it would only
have six years of capacity left at the Fort Gratiot site if Fort Gratiot continued to accept the same volume of out-of-state waste. 2
The Court decided that capacity was not the issue; the issue was
economic protectionism, and the Court labeled the Michigan statute a "protectionist measure" that could not hold up under Commerce Clause analysis. 3
17. In a different twist on the issue, a case currently on certiorari before the Court,
Town of Clarksville v. C & A Carbone, Inc., 587 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1992), cert. granted, 113 S.
Ct. 2411 (1993), challenges a local ordinance that required all solid waste processed or handled in the locality be disposed of at the town-authorized disposal site, prohibiting export of
municipal solid waste from the locality.
18. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2024.
19. Id.
20. City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 628.
21. Supreme Court Hears Oral Arguments in Michigan Solid Waste Litigation,
STATE ENV'T REP., Apr. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, Envtl Library (quoting Mr. Harold
Finn of Finn Dixon & Herling of Stamford, Connecticut, during oral argument before the
United States Supreme Court in Fort Gratiot case) [hereinafter Supreme Court Hears Oral
Arguments].
22. Id. (paraphrasing Michigan state Assistant Solicitor General Thomas Casey during oral argument of the Fort Gratiot case before the United States Supreme Court).
23. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2028.
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Other states have also tried legislative means to protect their
borders from the flood of out-of-state trash that threatens to overflow their landfills. The nation's oldest and largest hazardous waste
disposal facility in the country is located in Emelle, Alabama,
where approximately ninety percent of the tonnage each year
comes from other states.2 The base tipping fee2 5 for all hazardous
waste dumped at the Emelle facility was $25.60/ton.2 Alabama
also imposed an additional tipping fee of $72.00/ton on hazardous
waste generated outside of the state that was disposed of within
the state of Alabama. 27 It was this surcharge that found disfavor
with the United States Supreme Court. 28 The Court found that the
fee facially discriminated against hazardous waste from states
outside of Alabama, and, therefore, could not withstand Commerce
Clause scrutiny.2 9
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. followed its victory in Alabama with a victory in Louisiana, when it (along with the Supreme
Court's decision in Chemical Waste Management) convinced the
Louisiana Legislature to rescind its hazardous waste fee structure,
which was similar to Alabama's.3 ° It had been enacted over fear
that the hazardous waste deflected from Alabama due to the high
cost of disposal, would end up in Louisiana landfills.3 1 When Alabama's law was declared unconstitutional, the Louisiana Legislature repealed the additional fees it had established.32
South Carolina was also concerned about the amount of hazardous waste pouring into it, and, in 1989, enacted a legislative provision that prohibited the disposal of hazardous waste in South Carolina if the waste came from states that prohibited the treatment
of hazardous waste within their boundaries, or that had not entered into an interstate or regional agreement for the safe treatment of hazardous waste. 3 In other words it created a "blacklist"
of states whose hazardous waste it would refuse to accept.
24. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2011-12 (1992).
25. A tipping fee is the amount charged to dispose of waste at a disposal site. Usually
it is a fee per ton of waste, but it can also be assessed in other ways. Supreme Court Hears
Oral Arguments, cited at note 21.
26. ALA. CODE § 22-30B-2(a) (Supp. 1991).
27. ALA. CODE § 22-30B-2(b) (Supp. 1991).
28. Chemical Waste Management, 112 S. Ct. at 2015.
29. Id. at 2014-15.
30. Chemical Waste Scores Big Win in Louisiana Tax Dispute, ENV'T WEEK, July 9,
1992 [hereinafter Chemical Waste Scores Big].
31. Chemical Waste Scores Big, cited at note 30.
32. Id.
33. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-56-130(4) (Law. Co-op. 1989).
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North Carolina was placed on South Carolina's blacklist, and
suit was filed in federal court to enjoin the enforcement of the
Act.34 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that South Carolina seemed to want to penalize waste generators residing in states
that failed, in South Carolina's eyes, to properly plan for managing
their own hazardous waste.3 5 The court granted the preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the contested provisions, stating in its opinion:
[Tihe effect of every state designing particular limits and bars for out-of-

state waste could be catastrophic. Indeed, such treatment of hazardous
waste-in essence, ensured nontreatment of some hazardous waste-might
destroy not only the theoretical principle of a national economic union, but
contains the real potential to destroy land, if not also persons, within the
union. Unless and until Congress alters the law, the apparent Congressional
intent. . . would seem to remain-better that hazardous waste be treated
and disposed of somewhere, even if spread disproportionately among the
3
states, than that future Superfund sites arise.

In a 1991 effort to eliminate the importation of MSW into the
state, the Indiana Legislature introduced a three-part regulatory
3
system7.
The first section of the statute instituted a ban on
backhauling in certain types of vehicles. 38 It restricted the type of
truck that would be allowed to collect MSW and transport it into
Indiana, thereby eliminating the practice of backhauling for those
who did not dedicate their trucks to the transport of suitable
materials as indicated under the statute.3 9 The second part of the

statute imposed the backhauling ban by requiring that trucks be
registered with the Indiana Department of Environment Manage34. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781 (4th Cir.
1991).
35.

Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 945 F.2d at 791 (citation omitted).

36. Id. at 792 (citation omitted).
37. IND. CODE §§ 13-7-31-1 to 13-7-31-16 (1991).
38. IND. CODE § 13-7-31-13.1 (1991). Backhauling is a practice employed by truckers,
where they load what would otherwise be an empty trailer or flatbed with municipal solid
waste, and haul it to a disposal site. The practice is usually employed after the trucker has
dropped the primary load, and is returning to the base of operation. If the trucker did not
haul the trash, the trailer would be vacant. Backhauling allows truckers to make additional
money by renting their trailers to ship the waste to the disposal site. Government Suppliers
Consolidating Serv. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267, 1272 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 977
(1993).

39. Suitable trucks were trucks that transported municipal waste; special waste; hazardous waste; waste from the combustion of coal; recyclable material; wood, concrete, brick
and other construction and demolition material; dirt, sand, gravel, asphalt, salt, and other
highway maintenance material; coal, gypsum, slag, scrap metal, and other bulk industrial
commodities; and infectious waste. IND. CODE § 13-7-31-13.1 (1991).
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ment, indicating that the truck was in compliance with the
backhauling requirements, and prohibiting landfills from accepting
waste from trucks not bearing the required identification sticker.4 °
The final portion of the regulatory scheme imposed one uniform
disposal fee on all waste, and an additional fee that applied only to
waste from outside of Indiana.' 1
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found all three of the Indiana provisions violative of the Commerce Clause.' 2 It relied
heavily on the Supreme Court's decisions in City of Philadelphia
and Fort Gratiot, noting that the regulatory scheme, taken as a
whole, had the purpose and effect of significantly reducing the flow
of out-of-state garbage into the state of Indiana, by increasing the
cost of disposing of the waste in Indiana. 5 Once again, a state effort to protect itself from others' waste was stymied.
The state of Massachusetts tried a regulatory route similar to
that attempted in Indiana. Massachusetts required all vehicles
that were licensed to transport hazardous waste in Massachusetts
to display a sticker, at a cost of $200 each." When the fee structure was challenged in state court, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts concluded that the flat fees benefitted in-state companies and discriminated against out-of-state trucking companies,
by making it more expensive to do business in Massachusetts."' It
6
too struck down the fees as violative of the Commerce Clause.'
In 1990, the Georgia legislature enacted legislation that labeled
out-of-state MSW as "special solid waste," requiring landfill operators to apply for a permit from the state to handle and dump this
"special" waste into landfills operating in the state of Georgia."7 It
also subjected solid waste handlers to onerous administrative requirements if the handler wished to dump out-of-state waste in
Georgia.' 8 When the statute was contested in Southern States
40.

IND. CODE

41.

IND. CODE

42.
43.

§ 13-7-31-8 and § 13-7-31-14(1) (1991).
§ 13-9.5-5-1(b) (1991).

Government Suppliers, 975 F.2d at 1286.
Id. at 1278-79.
44. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21C, §§ 7, 5 (1990).
45. American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. Secretary of Admin., 613 N.E.2d 95, 103 (Mass.
1993).
46. American Trucking, 613 N.E.2d at 105.
47. GA. CODE ANN. § 22 (1990).
48. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-27 (1990). These additional requirements for obtaining a
permit to dump out-of-state waste included developing a waste analysis plan and identifying
types of waste received by the facility. The statute dictated that all out-of-state waste be
accompanied by a manifest noting its quantity and composition, and its origin, routing and
destination. It instituted a $10/ton fee for disposal of all out-of-state waste in Georgia land-
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Landfill v. Georgia Department of Natural Resources,49 the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia determined that the Georgia system unfairly discriminated against
out-of-state waste, in violation of the Commerce Clause.50 It
granted summary judgment to Southern States Landfill, relying on
precedent set by the Supreme Court in City of Philadelphia and
Fort Gratiot, and refused to allow the state of Georgia to enforce
the disputed provisions of the statute."
ALLOWABLE RESTRICTIONS ON INTERSTATE DISPOSAL OF WASTE
Some states have had better luck in keeping other states' trash
out of their landfills. The rulings in Fort Gratiot and City of Philadelphia declared unconstitutional state-adopted measures
prohibiting the import of MSW.5 2 There is no prohibition, however, on private operators who refuse to accept out-of-state waste
for disposal in their landfills. In 1992, Indiana had some measure
of success in reducing the out-of-state waste going into its landfills
when some of its landfill owners began utilizing this loophole.
When six of Indiana's seven landfills stopped accepting waste imports, the amount of waste dumped in Indiana's landfills decreased
from 50,000 tons in January, 1992 to a little more than 14,000 tons
in August.5 3 Another technique Indiana implemented to help reduce its waste imports was to sign formal agreements with other
states." These agreements eliminated imports of garbage from
New Jersey, and decreased imports from both New York and
fills, and subjected the facilities to random inspection by Georgia's Department of Natural
Resources, Environmental Protection Division. On top of all these rules, the solid waste
handling permit was only good for ten years. Georgia waste was not subject to any of these
rules. Id.
49. 801 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ga. 1992).
50. Southern States Landfill, 801 F. Supp. at 736. It is interesting to note that part
of the testimony Georgia offered in defense of its regulatory scheme discriminating against
out-of-state waste was that citizens of Georgia were more trustworthy than citizens from
other states. Id. at 731 (citations omitted).
51. Id. at 733.
52. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2028; City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629.
53. Waste Haulers Stay Away From Hoosier Territory, SOLID WASTE REPORT, Nov.
26, 1992 available in LEXIS, Envtl Library [hereinafter Waste Haulers Stay Away]. Two of
the six had stopped accepting waste imports because they closed. As of November, 1992, of
the five landfills in operation in Indiana, three were still not accepting out-of-state trash. Id.
54. Waste Haulers Stay Away, cited at note 53. The agreements provide for assisting
in "background checks of 'good character' of companies applying for permits; providing investigative information on anyone involved in solid waste management; assisting in enforcement efforts; and developing a cross-training program so waste enforcement, permitting and
operations personnel are trained to recognize illegal activities." Id.
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Pennsylvania. 5 So far, these interstate disposal agreements have
not been challenged in court on Commerce Clause grounds.5
Montana has relatively low tipping fees of $i2-15/ton, and is
considered one of the least expensive states in which to deposit
trash.5 7 In 1989, Montana instituted a two-year moratorium on imports of MSW, giving the state time to prepare itself for a perceived onslaught of out-of-state garbage. 58 The moratorium was extended for the same reason in 1991 for two more years.5 9 Despite
the Fort Gratiot decision in 1991, no one has contested Montana's
moratorium. 0
Rhode Island has also managed to effectively ban the imports of
MSW.6 The state has one large regional landfill (Central Landfill),
which is operated by the state, and five small, municipally owned
landfills which are for the exclusive use of the those communities.0 2
In 1987, Rhode Island banned the disposal of out-of-state waste at
Central, claiming it was a public resource reserved for the citizens
of the state of Rhode Island.6 3 The ban was challenged in federal
court by a Massachusetts hauler, who claimed the ban violated the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution.6 ' The district court upheld
the ban because it did not restrict waste imports to privatelyowned waste facilities. 5 The practical effect of the ban on imports,
however, allows Rhode Island to maintain Central Landfill for the
exclusive use of its residents.
The state of Pennsylvania has orchestrated a more circumspect
approach to stem the tide of trash across it borders. Labeled "Operation Trashnet," the state combined the efforts of the state Departments of Environmental Resources and Transportation and
the Pennsylvania State Police. The operation instituted inspection
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
Montana Offers Cheap Disposal of Waste, But Not to Outsiders, SOLID WASTE
REPORT, Dec. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, Envtl Library [hereinafter Montanta Offers
Cheap Disposal].
58. Montana Offers Cheap Disposal, cited at note 57.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Other states that have used a similar method to avoid MSW imports are the District of Columbia, Maryland and Oregon. Attorney Says States-Not U.S. Government-Hold Keys to Waste Transport, INTEGRATED WASTE MANAGEMENT, Aug. 8, 1990,
available in LEXIS Envtl Library [hereinafter Attorney Says States].
62. Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204, 1206 (D.R.I. 1987).
63. Lefrancois, 669 F. Supp. at 1206.
64. Id. at 1207.
65. Id. at 1212.
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stations at ten locations near Pennsylvania landfills.6 6 The Governor of Pennsylvania insisted that the inspections were "to crack
down on illegal and unsafe garbage trucks," but he continued,
"[w]e wanted to send a message to the waste industry: Don't dump
on Pennsylvania. 6 7 During the inspections, the state police and
the Department of Transportation checked all trucks, including
waste trucks, to ensure conformance with weight, maintenance and
other safety regulations. 8 The Department of Environmental Resources also screened the garbage trucks for violations of Pennsylvania's environmental regulations that relate to waste haulers.6 9
The September 1992 Trashnet operation was the fifth such effort
in the state of Pennsylvania since 1989, designed to stem the
stream of trash coming into the state.7 0 Lacking federal authority
to institute an outright ban on garbage imports, Operation
Trashnet will probably continue.
A final technique states may use to slow the flow of out-of-state
garbage across state borders is to refuse to license a new landfill
unless the developer "voluntarily" agrees to restrict or eliminate
out-of-state waste at that site. 72 Employing this procedure, however, may prove to be a double-edged sword for the states. If the
developer agrees to the ban and the landfill is created, the state
wins. If the developer rejects the stipulation of banning out-ofstate waste, the state has lost a new landfill site. States that seek
to use this system should seriously consider whether they can afford, both financially and ecologically, to forfeit a new landfill
66. Gov. Casey Renews Call For Federal Out-of-State Waste Law; Launches Fifth
Operation Trashnet Inspection Program, PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 24, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Envtl Library [hereinafter Gov. Casey Renews Call].
67. Gov. Casey Renews Call, cited at note 66 (quoting Pennsylvania Governor Robert
Casey speaking at Delaware Water Gap, Pennsylvania, during his inspection of the September, 1992 Operation Trashnet). Since Operation Trashnet began, Pennsylvania authorities
have stopped 18,522 trucks, issued 502 safety violations and put 603 trucks and 101 drivers
out of service. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. Under Operation Trashnet, the Department of Environmental Resources inspected 14,066 garbage trucks, finding 4,127 violations. It has ordered 305 trucks removed
from the Commonwealth due to illegal loads. Id.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
It should be noted that the author has no knowledge of states actually issuing

such a harsh ultimatum to potential new landfill operators. Political realities, however,
would indicate that this could indeed be a potential scenario. An operator with a pending
application for a landfill license (as well as the operator's attorney) would be quite aware of
the regulatory traps that could ensnare the application in bureaucratic red tape, and might
be willing to avoid such entanglements if it suited his economic interests.
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location.
FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE MEASURES

While states have enacted the various legislative and nonlegislative measures noted above to try to stop waste imports, they have
also looked to .the federal government for help with their perceived
predicament. Since the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate commerce between states, Congress alone has the ability to place limits on garbage exports, and allow states to restrict or completely ban waste
imports. In July 1992, just a month after the Supreme Court overturned the Michigan and Alabama laws in Fort Gratiot and Chemical Waste Management, respectively, legislation was introduced
in the United States Senate to give governors of states the power

to suspend out-of-state waste imports. 73 A similar bill in the House

of Representatives failed to make it to the floor for a vote, and
died in committee. 7 During the 1993 legislative session, companion
bills were introduced in both the Senate and the House which
would give governors the authority to freeze imports of out-of-state
waste to either 1991 or 1992 levels, and ban all waste imports to
landfills that had not received any out-of-state waste in 1991. 7 1 A

similar bill was also introduced in the House, entitled the Local
Government Interstate Waste Control Act.7' Traditionally, exporting states, like New Jersey and New York, have opposed these
measures, while the importing states of Pennsylvania and Indiana
favored them.77 The bills introduced early this year seem to have a
73. Coats Makes Third Legislative Try to Ban Interstate Waste Shipments, SOLID
WASTE REPORT, Mar. 4, 1993 [hereinafter Coats Makes Third]. S. 2877, 102d Congress, 1st
Sess. (1992). The Senate bill was introduced by Sen. Dan Coats (R-Ind.). Id.
74. Boucher Reintroduces Bill To Give Localities Control Over MSW Imports, SOLID
WASTE REPORT, Feb. 25, 1993 [hereinafter Boucher Reintroduces Bill]. H.R. 3952. 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1992).
75. Boucher Reintroduces Bill, cited at note 74. The Senate bill was S. 439, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) and the House bill was H.R. 1076 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). In
addition to the ability to completely ban imports, governors would also have the capacity to
limit out-of-state waste shipments to landfills that received greater than 50,000 tons of
MSW in 1991, if the imports were at 30 percent or more of the amount received in 1991.
Coats Makes Third, cited at note 73.
76. H.R. 963, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The bill was sponsored by Rep. Rick
Boucher (D-Va.), and cosponsored by representatives from Michigan, Louisiana, Kansas,
Texas, South Carolina, Vermont, Maryland. Boucher Reintroduces Bill, cited at note 74.
77. The Senate bill is sponsored by senators from Indiana, Kentucky, Kansas,
Oklahoma, Iowa, Missouri, Ohio, Michigan and Tennessee. The House bill is endorsed by
representatives from Oregon, Nebraska, Indiana, Ohio, Tennessee, Missouri and South Dakota. Coats Make Third, cited at note 73.
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good chance of passing, and, unlike previous bills, appear to have
the approval of the President.7 8 Whether the President's campaign
statements are more than simply rhetoric, however, remains to be
seen.
Importing states that are gazing towards Congress for a solution
to the interstate waste problem may be looking in the wrong direction. According to William L. Kovacs, who was the chief counsel
for the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Transportation and Commerce during the development and enactment of
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, "[it takes
the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] three to six years to
promulgate a regulation. It takes another two to four years for the
courts to decide on a regulation's validity." 79 He also stated that it
took EPA twelve years to issue guidelines for recycled product procurement.8 0 With this kind of track record, combined with the lack
of federal funding that proliferates today, Congress should be the
last resort for importing states looking to slow the stream of waste
across their borders.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION ALLOWING STATES
To BAN OUT-OF-STATE GARBAGE IMPORTS

Most states that import out-of-state waste are very anxious to
stop other states from dumping on them. At first blush, this seems
to be a rational proposition: make every state responsible for the
garbage it generates. Unfortunately, it is not as simple as it sounds.
No state in the union is completely self-reliant when it comes to
disposing of its own garbage; all states are exporters of some
wastes and importers of others. 1 Why, then, are these states trying
to stop waste imports? Will not Michigan's attempt to keep Penn78. During his 1992 campaign, then-candidate Bill Clinton endorsed the right of
states to decide whose garbage can cross their borders. He stated, "fo]ne of the things we
should do is that the United States Congress should pass, and the president should sign, an
act which gives every state the right to ban the import of out-of-state waste." Coats Makes
Third, cited at note 73 (quoting Mr. Clinton from a statement he made during a debate in
South Dakota on February 23, 1992).
The Bush Administration opposed the 1992 bill, stating, "[t]his type of inflexible approach will significantly restrict the nation's ability to manage solid waste sensibly." Yancy,
cited at riote 1.
79. Attorney Says States, cited at note 61 (quoting Mr. Kovacs in an address he
made at the 1990 National Solid Waste Forum on Integrated Municipal Waste Management
in Milwaukee, Wis. in August, 1990).
80. Id.
81. Stephen L. Kass and Michael B. Gerrard, An Expanding Field of Practice, N.Y.
L.J., Jan. 22, 1993, at 3.
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sylvania's solid waste out of its borders meet with similar resistance by Pennsylvania against Michigan's hazardous waste? In this
scenario, neither state benefits, and all the citizens lose. It is this
type of retaliation and economic protectionism that the Commerce
Clause sought to avoid. 2
State citizens, sadly, do not possess such a national mindset.
What they see is another ugly landfill in their state, made necessary because other states are filling up the existing landfills with
out-of-state waste. The "not in my backyard"8 3 mentality possessed by these citizens is misplaced and unwarranted. Economic
forces should be allowed to determine where and when new waste
disposal sites are situated. States that have the capacity and desire
to build new landfills should be encouraged to do so, and states
that do not should not be punished because of it. State citizens
must look beyond their own backyard for the answers to the nation's waste disposal problem.
For instance, examine the hazardous waste disposal question.
Since few states produce very large quantities of hazardous waste,
a requirement that every state dispose of its own hazardous waste
would be environmentally and economically wasteful. 8 ' At a cost of
between $100 and $150 million to construct a hazardous waste
site, 85 there would be few bidders anxious to construct such a facility unless they were assured that they could solicit business from
out-of-state. Otherwise, a facility built to accommodate the hazardous waste disposal needs of a company in the state would be
superfluous if the company relocated to another state. Given the
fact that most states would not be able to attract the capital to site
a hazardous waste facility, 86 what would they do with the hazardous wastes generated if the states that do have hazardous waste
dumps prohibit or restrict imports? As the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals noted in Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, "better
82. As the Eighth Circuit court recently noted in declaring an Arkansas waste import
restriction unconstitutional, "[o]ur economic unit is the Nation .... [t]he states are not
separable economic units." SoutheastArkansas Landfill, Inc. v. Arkansas, 981 F.2d 372, 377
(8th Cir. 1992) (quoting H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1949)).
83. The popular acronym for "not in my backyard" is "NIMBY."
84. Lynda Singletary, Closely Watched Borders; Interstate Transportationof Hazardous Wastes, CHEMICAL MARKETING REP., Nov. 16, 1992 (quoting Doug MacMillan, the
director of National Solid Waste Management Association's Institute of Chemical Waste
Management's hazardous waste programs, discussing the placement of hazardous waste
facilities).
85. Singletary, cited at note 84.
86. Id.
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that hazardous waste be treated and disposed of somewhere, even
if spread disproportionately among the states, than that future
Superfund sites arise.""
Nonhazardous solid waste, also called MSW, constitutes a more
massive (in terms of volume) problem. Approximately twenty-eight
thousand tons of garbage are transported interstate each day in
the United States. 88 At least forty-three states transfer fifteen million tons of MSW between states each year. 9 Those states that
have the ability to landfill this waste within their borders do not
necessarily do so. What dictates the location in which the trash is
landfilled is more a matter of economics than anything else. The
least expensive alternative is usually chosen by the disposal companies. If it costs more to dump the garbage in the disposer's home
state, it may choose to dump it somewhere else. This same basic
business decision is made by companies every day, all over the
country. "Should I buy those parts from a New York supplier, or
go with the supplier from my own state?" It would not be unreasonable to venture that very few business decisions are made based
on the state in which the company is located. Rather, the costs
involved are evaluated, the quality of the products and services are
compared, and a decision is made after considering which mix of
these factors best fits the needs of the company. This is and should
continue to be the process by which disposal companies dispose of
the trash they collect.
On the other side of the economic coin are the suppliers of trash,
the people and companies that reside in the state. While the disposal companies are seeking the least expensive alternative to dispose
of their trash, what incentive do these people have to reduce the
amount of garbage they generate? These producers of municipal
solid waste are the first to gripe if someone wants to construct a
landfill near them, and yet they are loath to shoulder the burden of
disposal.90 As was recently noted, "[t]he key to a rational garbage
policy is to insure that the prices people are charged for disposal
services reflect the true social costs of getting rid of the stuff.""
87. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 945 F.2d at 792.
88. Attorney Says States, cited at note 61 (quoting Mr. Kovacs in an address he
made at the 1990 National Solid Waste Forum on Integrated Municipal Waste Management
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in August, 1990).
89. Sloane, cited at note 2, at 10.
90. Evidence of this loathing abounds'when a city government attempts to raise taxes
to cover the cost to dispose of the city's garbage.
91. Peter Passell, The Garbage Problem: It May Be Politics, Not Nature, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 1991, at C1.
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One proposed way to match the amount of garbage generated to its
disposal cost is to tax products according to the post-consumption
cost of cleaning them up.9 2 A drawback to this plan is that cleanup costs are hard to calculate.9 3 Other communities have begun to
charge households for waste disposal, based on the amount of trash
left at the curb for collection."4 While new, these programs pose
many logistical problems; however, they should be considered as
valid alternatives to government regulation of the municipal solid
waste industry.
Another recommendation made to help solve a state's importation dilemma is for the state (rather than the federal government)
to regulate the disposal industry as a public utility. 5 The state of
New Jersey has adopted this practice, and New Jersey's average
tipping fees are the highest in the nation.9 6 The neighboring state
of Pennsylvania, however, does not regulate its disposal industry,
and its tipping fees remain below the national average. 7 One of
the reasons cited for Pennsylvania's lower tipping fees is the fact
that they are effectively limited by competition. 8 Based on the
models in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, granting state public utility status to the waste disposal industry will do little to resolve a
state's garbage problem.
CONCLUSION

Federal legislation should not allow states to discriminate
92. Id. An example is that laundry detergent sold in a plastic bottle might have five
cents added onto its cost, while a cardboard container of detergent would only have a one
cent "clean-up tax" added onto it. Id.
93. Id. Even if the cost of disposing of a product could be determined, consumers
might still be willing to pay the additional five cents for packaging they find more
convenient.
94. Id. In Seattle, it costs each household $13.50 to dispose of its first garbage can of
household waste each week, and $9.00 for each additional can. Recyclable materials were
hauled free of charge. In the first year that these charges were imposed, Seattle's MSW
disposal dropped by twenty-two percent. Id.
95. Passell, cited at note 91, at Cl. Public utilities are closely monitored by state
agencies, and are allowed a monopoly on the commodity they supply to consumers. Fee or
rate increases for the products or service they offer to the consumer must usually be approved by a public utility commission that oversees the utility.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. Another item of note is that in Pennsylvania, the incentive to invest in a
multi-million dollar landfill remains high. If there is demand for the space, it will pay for
itself in tipping fees. In New Jersey in 1988, there were only two pending applications for
landfill sites, while in the same year in Pennsylvania there were thirty-one applications
pending. Id.
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against other states' trash. This type of plan would jeopardize the
nation as a whole, because each state's import policy would become
a political question. The garbage problems the nation faces are too
big for each individual state to manage. There are a limited number of potential landfill sites in each state, and although some
states have a greater capacity than others, eventually even those
will be filled. The real force of a national program should aim to
convince the public that landfill sites are safe and necessary." A
national crusade should encourage recycling and waste reduction.
It should also foster the establishment of more solid waste landfill
facilities. 0 0 The technology exists to build ecologically sound landfills. With the proper economic incentives, states can build and
maintain their own MSW facilities, or they can delegate this responsibility to private enterprise. In either case, the market forces
will determine whether it is better for the state to continue to ship
its garbage out-of-state, or to dispose of it within its own borders.
In today's society, everyone bears the cost of disposing of increasingly larger amounts of MSW. At some point, economic principles indicate that, as the number of available landfills decrease,
the cost of disposing of waste increases. An unpopular way to stop
the upward spiral is to build more landfills. Another way is to decrease the amount of trash that goes into existing landfills. The
third and least attractive alternative is to allow federal regulation
of the waste industry. The third approach could bring disastrous
consequences, the worst of which is more trash. We must remember that we are in the early stages of a national crisis. If the federal
government steps in with price regulations, it will make matters
better for all-at first. In the future, however, we will be confronted with developing a solution to the ultimate problem: What
are we going to do with all the trash?
Allowing states to limit MSW imports will not solve the United
States' problem of shrinking landfill space. Eventually, every state
will have to face the fact that its landfill space is finite. States that
have the capacity to import trash will be able to make other states
pay dearly for the importation privilege. This expense might be the
only impetus for states to find the space for a landfill. If a state
99. An EPA-commissioned report conducted by Tufts University studied hazardous
waste capacity. The research showed that there is no shortage of landfill capacity, only a
public perception of one. Singletary, cited at note 84.
100. The Tufts University study suggested that the public must believe that a waste
facility poses a low risk, and that the facility represents a legitimate need, not based solely
on cost/benefit analysis. Singletary, cited at note 84.
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does not have the space, or the state's citizens refuse to allow construction of a new landfill, let the citizens pay. Money is, after all,
a commodity that every state in the union is willing to import.
Holly McCann

